Towards a Common Maritime Security Strategy: An Assessment of Indonesia and Australia’s Security Agendas Post-Maritime Cooperation Action Plan (2018–2022) Amid Indo-Pacific Tensions
The year 2022 marks the end of the Indonesia-Australia Maritime Cooperation Action Plan as an instrument to direct both countries’ policies in maintaining their maritime security, especially in the midst of power competition in the Indo-Pacific. The complexity of the Indo- Pacific security condition — characterised by increasingly organised maritime crime as well as increasing Chinese military activity — has called for a cooperation-based security framework in the region. This is because the Indo-Pacific becomes the main transportation route for trade commodities and global energy supply, making it a more volatile arena for power competition (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020). Indonesia and Australia have succeeded in being the pioneers of a cooperation-based security framework by signing the Indonesia-Australia Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation in 2017, followed by the preparation of the Maritime Cooperation Action Plan to be implemented in 2018–2022 (Darmawan, 2021). As the Action Plan expires this year, this essay discusses both countries’ maritime security agendas and policies, as well as the opportunities and challenges that should be addressed in further action plans.
A prior understanding of the Maritime Cooperation Joint Declaration and Action Plan is required before assessing why such cooperation is pursued by Indonesia and Australia. In 2017, both countries started discussions on how to strengthen maritime cooperation — echoing a commitment to maritime safety and security measures as stated in the 2006 Lombok Treaty — after the signing of the Joint Declaration (Australian Treaty Series, 2008). On the one hand, Indonesia is concerned with transnational organised crime, such as, maritime piracy, maritime pollution, and illegal fishing; on the other hand, Australia pays more attention to combatting narcotics production and trafficking (Hermansyah, 2018). Due to the common interests in the maritime domain, Indonesia and Australia signed a Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation — emphasising support for a rules-based order as a prerequisite to mutual economic and security benefits. Hence, both Joint Declaration and Action Plan are fundamental for maritime collaboration between the two countries.
A cooperation-based security framework is required by Indonesia and Australia due to three factors: the geopolitics of both countries, the existence of a common enemy, and patterns of security complex in the Indo-Pacific. First, geographical proximity has increased the need for comprehensive partnerships. Indonesia’s strategic cross position — being situated between two continents and two oceans — has generated opportunities for Australia to be more involved in ASEAN-based forums and to access the Indonesian market, the latter being a large market for Australian products. However, the position itself could create a security problem, considering the Indonesian waters configure two-thirds of the country’s territory that remains difficult to patrol. Second, because of a more assertive military activity and a power competition in Indo- Pacific, there is a need to establish and maintain a rules-based international order, especially one echoing the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. If there are hardly any measures to combat these security threats, Indonesia and Australia’s security will be equally threatened. This leads to the third factor, in which countries dealing with similar security threats require a common response — generally in the form of pacts and/or military alliances.
In order to elaborate further on patterns of security complex in the Indo-Pacific, this essay utilises the security complex from Barry Buzan (2003). As inter-state interactions at regional levels become bridges for interactions between states and the international system as a whole, Buzan defined the term ‘security complex’ as a group of countries with security issues closely related to each other, hence cannot be separated. Indonesia-Australia relations are defined by two interdependence patterns: (1) patterns of amity, in which bilateral relations are marked by the patterns of friendship, mutual support, and protection; as well as (2) patterns of enmity, in which bilateral relations are characterised by the patterns of inter-state distrust, suspicion, and fear. There is a directly proportional relationship — the higher the enmity levels in the bilateral interactions, the higher the security instability in the region. Hence, a reevaluation of strategy is important for Indonesia and Australia should there be any changes, either inside or outside the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, to safeguard their national securities.
As one of the signatories of the Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation, Indonesia has a clear maritime strategy — especially under the Joko Widodo administration — yet the country maintains a definitional vagueness on ‘maritime security’. Historically, Indonesia has viewed its territorial waters as a strategic domain, proven by concepts of ‘Wawasan Bahari’ (Oceanic Outlook) and ‘Wawasan Nusantara’ (Archipelago Outlook) as strategic discourses in relation to maritime security in Soekarno and Soeharto presidencies respectively (Kembara, 2021). In recent years, Joko Widodo has also formulated the 2014 Global Maritime Fulcrum vision and the 2017 Indonesian Ocean Policy that represents a shift in the country’s conceptualisation of maritime security — with the latter document outlining seven policy pillars towards the GMF (Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs of Indonesia, 2017; Kembara, 2017). Despite the existence of documents and the establishment of new bodies to accommodate contemporary issues in maritime security, Indonesia does not have a common definition of what constitutes maritime security. Hence, governmental bodies — e.g., Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Indonesian Water Police (POLAIR), and Indonesian Presidential Task Force to Combat Illegal Fishing (SATGAS 115) — have different means “to foster a strong, effective maritime law enforcement agency, and strong maritime culture” (Morris & Paoli, 2018).
While Indonesia has embraced maritime security within the governmental bodies, the Australian maritime security strategy has also maintained a definitional vagueness. The most recent document is the 2020 Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA) that differentiates ‘civil’ maritime security and ‘other’ types of maritime security — the former referring to the “relationships between overseas partners and … a broad range of domestic organisations …, as well as relationships with industry and the public” (Australian Border Force, 2020; Letts, 2021). It is important to note that the Australian government has put eight issues within civil maritime security threats: (1) unauthorised maritime arrivals; (2) maritime terrorism; (3) prohibited imports and exports; (4) illegal exploitation of natural resources; (5) piracy, robbery, or violence at sea; (6) illegal activity in protected areas; (7) a compromise to biosecurity; and (8) marine pollution (Australian Border Force, 2020). Despite the categories, the Australian Government uses ‘maritime security’ without a single agreed definition, hence leading to different definitions amongst government bodies; the Department of Home Affairs and Australian Border Force do not put maritime security as a primary focus, yet the Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade does (Letts, 2021).
The Indo-Pacific power play might be accounted for by the definitional vagueness of ‘maritime security’, yet this scenario encouraged Indonesia and Australia to team up and form a joint maritime security strategy. On the one hand, Indonesia and Australia have interests in the international maritime domain, yet both countries aim to maintain security via hedging. Hoping to maintain its role as the hegemon, the United States wants to maintain a rules-based international order by repressing the Chinese assertive military activities. Power competition between the current and the emerging hegemons has encouraged Indonesia and Australia to avoid direct confrontation, and one way to do so is through vague strategies and statements — in this context, definitional vagueness. As the traditional ally of the U.S., Australia aims to maintain the international status quo with America as the leader and to deal with the rise of China; this simultaneously happens with Indonesia wanting to avoid being perceived by China as doing a balancing strategy and avoid any multilateral efforts to counter China, for such policies help Indonesia to profit from the competition and reduce dependency (Harold et al., 2019). Hence, definitional vagueness becomes a useful component of both countries’ foreign policy.
On the other hand, Indonesia-Australia Maritime Cooperation Action Plan and Joint Declaration are crucial for finding common areas of interest, adding more patterns of amity to formulate a common maritime security strategy. The implementation may become difficult due to the COVID-19 pandemic, yet one of the most notable achievements of the collaboration is Operation Gannet 5. With the purpose to increase maritime domain awareness and to deter illegal maritime activities, the operation is held by the Australian Border Force, BAKAMLA, the Directorate General of Surveillance for Marine and Fisheries Resources (PSDKP) and the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) (AFMA, 2021). Despite their wishes to profit from the power play, Indonesia and Australia remain insecure about their territorial waters due to their capacity constraints. Facing threats from China and the U.S. while lacking military and economic powers, Indonesia and Australia cannot counter the Chinese influence and cannot guarantee the credibility of the unipolar international system on their own. Hence, gathering like-minded alliances is a rational decision in order to guarantee the Indonesian and Australian maritime domain, for it provides an opportunity to diversify their allies outside of their traditional ones — i.e., ASEAN for Indonesia and the U.S. for Australia.
In short, Indonesia-Australia Maritime Cooperation Joint Declaration and Action Plan have indicated a mutually beneficial relationship in maritime security. The Indo-Pacific power competition remains as a paramount challenge, but through these instruments both Indonesia and Australia can endorse each other, helping both countries to access strategic assets that can minimise their political insecurities. Strategic interests and threats have become more clear as the Joint Declaration and Action Plan are formulated, yet in this period implementation of the papers is limited owing to the global pandemic and the countries’ stretched economies to deal with the pandemic. Despite the definitional vagueness in individual strategies, the documents become a basis for the diversification of allies amid the competition. Forging ahead, Indonesia has better institutional capacity for safeguarding its territorial waters, and Australia may still invest in its partner in order to safeguard its maritime borders as well. A renewal — or even, a more strengthened action plan — is beneficial to counter competition as well as to tackle both current and emerging maritime issues, strengthening bilateral cooperation in the long run.
References
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